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Problems in fairly allocating welfare and health resources or targeting social 
programmes are very often located in the spaces where citizens interact directly 
with state workers. This study draws on observations of doctor-patient 
encounters in disability assessments for the South African disability grant (DG), 
to examine how doctor-patient interactions shape social welfare allocation. I 
show that interactions between doctors and patients are sites of negotiation and 
contestation over rights to social assistance. Claimants’ understanding of 
disability differed from biomedical conceptions of disability. Doctors carrying 
out DG assessments faced both direct and indirect pressure from claimants, who 
aimed to influence their decisions through narratives of suffering and 
performances of disability. Frustrated by communication barriers, as well as the 
perceived unfairness and arbitrary nature of assessments, some claimants used 
verbal or physical abuse as a form of protest against the system. In order to 
defend themselves from these pressures and maintain authority in these 
interactions, doctors employed coping strategies that distanced and objectified 
claimants, minimising opportunities for patients to bully them or affect their 
judgment. These strategies strained already tense doctor-patient relationships 
and made the DG system illegible to the public. This demonstrates the 
importance of considering trust, power dynamics and the exercise of agency by 





On 9 March 2015, a group of middle-aged residents of the Cape Flats gathered 
in protest at the Heideveld community centre in Cape Town, carrying placards 
demanding the removal of the doctor who conducted medical assessments for 
the disability grant at their local clinic (Maragele, 2015). The disability grant 
(DG) is a means-tested cash transfer available on a permanent or temporary (6-





impairment and who do not have other sufficient means of support. Access to 
the DG is defined in terms of the medical model of disability and confirmation 
of disability by a medical doctor is required for all DG applications. This makes 
doctors who conduct DG assessments (either as contracted assessors at 
community clinics or treating doctors in hospitals) extremely important 
gatekeepers to this highly sought-after form of social assistance. In their 
gatekeeping role, doctors can be considered street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 
2010);1 i.e. frontline workers who control access to public services through the 
‘application’ – and interpretation – of government laws, rules and policies 
during their face-to-face encounters with citizens. 
  
Despite the wide reach of the South African social grant system, which serves 
almost 17 million people and two-thirds of households (Seekings & Moore, 
2013),2 social grants only target children (via their caregivers), the elderly and 
disabled people. In a context of high levels of structural employment such as 
prevail in South Africa, which makes it difficult even for the able-bodied to find 
work, there is high demand for the DG, including from people whom the grant is 
not intended to target (Kelly, 2013; Delany et al., 2005). 
  
The Heideveld protesters had all been receiving temporary disability grants, 
renewed once or twice a year by other doctors over the course of several years. 
The new doctor at the clinic, who was contracted specifically to conduct 
assessments as a third-party medical assessor, strictly followed SASSA’s 
medical assessment guidelines. These stipulate that the protesters’ diagnoses of 
epilepsy, diabetes, arthritis, angina and hypertension are manageable chronic 
conditions and therefore (in the absence of impairing complications) are not 
grounds for recommending a disability grant (SASSA, n.d.). These protesters, 
however, believed that their medical conditions made them unemployable. As 
unskilled or semi-skilled people in their fifties, they were unlikely to find work 
in a tight labour market in any case. They were essentially equating the lack of 
demand for their labour with disability and felt that they were being unfairly 
deprived of the state support necessary for them to manage their medical 
conditions. This dilemma was reflected on one of their banners: “how must we 
use our medication if we don’t have any food?” 
   
                                                 
1 Originally published in 1980 
2  In addition to the DG, the government provides a care dependency grant to parents of 
disabled children and the grant- in-aid, a small grant given to elderly or disabled people in need 
of permanent care. The state also makes five other categorically targeted, means-tested cash 
transfers available: Older Person’s Grant (also known as the old-age pension, for people over 
60); Child Support Grant (for children under 18); Foster Child Grant (for legal foster parents); 
Social Relief of Distress (short-term relief, often in the form of food parcels); and a War 





Disability grants have long been used as a ‘ticket’ to an income in poor 
communities, often in collaboration with sympathetic health and social workers 
(Segar, 1994; Steele et al., 2006; Kelly, 2013). Given the lack of jobs and social 
security for the long-term unemployed,  being disabled becomes a form of social 
advantage or a resource and is therefore a status that is a sought out. People go 
to great lengths to apply for disability grants, spending hours waiting in line and, 
until the government introduced a three month waiting period between 
applications in 2008, applying repeatedly until successful. 
  
The protest in Heideveld comes in the wake of government efforts to ‘tighten’ 
and ‘rationalise’ access to the grant after a rapid increase in DG numbers in the 
mid-2000s, which has limited the availability of an important source of income 
to many households and left them feeling disregarded by the state (Kelly, 2012, 
2013).3 While advocating for a social model of disability (Office of the Deputy 
President, 1997), the state has simultaneously sought to reduce the scope of the 
disability category for social assistance purposes. Reform has been driven by a 
discourse of reducing fraud by non-disabled people and over-generous doctors 
and since 2008, SASSA has made concerted efforts to reduce medical discretion 
in decision-making (Kelly, 2013). 
  
Given their prominent decision-making role in the DG application process, 
doctors bear the brunt of the anger of those who have lost their grants or new 
applicants that do not qualify and are frequently heckled, threatened or violently 
attacked by disgruntled claimants who feel unfairly treated during medical 
assessments. In recent years there have been a number of other cases where 
communities have demanded that doctors step down. While in some cases 
doctors have made poor decisions or behaved unprofessionally (see Green, 
2015; Interview SASSA Quality Assurance Officer, 2014 March 31), in other 
cases SASSA’s investigations found that doctors were simply following 
SASSA’s guidelines (Meeting with SASSA officials, 2016 April 21). This 
questioning of the legitimacy of medical decision-making and professional 
behaviour of doctors and presents, represents a serious breakdown in trust in 
doctor-patient relationships. More fundamentally, what claimants were 
contesting was the state’s definition of disability and their systematic exclusion 
from welfare benefits. 
  
                                                 
3 The number of DG beneficiaries has decreased from over 1.44 million in 2007 to less than 
1,1 million in 2016. The extent to which this can be attributed to SASSA’s Disability 
Management Model rather than other factors, such as the effect of the anti-retroviral roll-out 
for people with HIV, is not clear. SASSA officials, doctors and patients nevertheless all 
indicated that SASSA had become stricter in their approach, indicating that this had some 





Claimants also employ other less direct tactics to negotiate access to disability 
grants, contest medico-bureaucratic definitions of disability and protest their 
exclusion from the social security system. These come in the form of individual, 
often hidden, acts of protest and subversion what Scott refers to as ‘infrapolitics’ 
- which occur daily in the individual interactions between doctors and patients 
inside of the consultation room and which will be the focus of this paper. 
Drawing on Foucauldian (1979) notions of power as decentralised, productive 
and dynamic and the work of Scott (1985, 1990), de Certeau (1984) and Barnes 
& Prior (2009) on subaltern agency and defiance, this paper discusses the micro-
politics of resistance and subversion that emerge during face-to-face encounters 
between doctors and DG claimants. I demonstrate that disability grant 
assessments are a dialogical and contingent process - a space of resistance and 
contestation as well as disciplining and control by the state. As Foucault argued: 
“where there is power there is resistance” (Foucault, 1979: 96). Although not all 
doctors prescribed to a purely medical-bureaucratic definition of disability, this 
was official SASSA policy and I have understood claimants’ attempts to 
convince doctors to stretch or abandon the medical-bureaucratic definition used 
by the state as contestations of the definitions that structure their exclusion. 
  
The agency of claimants who resist and disrupt the DG assessment process 
highlights power dynamics is often overlooked in studies of policy 
implementation, including bottom-up studies that (like this study) draw on 
Lipsky’s (2010) notion of street-level bureaucracy. The street-level bureaucracy 
concept explains the gaps that emerge between policy and practice as being the 
result of patterns in workers’ use of their discretion to cope with the realities of 
work with clients and citizens (Brodkin, 2012). By unpacking the contextual and 
subjective factors and logics that structure bureaucratic work, this literature has 
deepened our understanding of policy implementation, but is limited in its 
presumption that, as decision-makers, street-level bureaucrats hold all the power 
in social relations at the frontline. Clients (and patients) are typically considered 
in terms of how they are acted upon rather than as contributors to the 
implementation process who co-construct institutional categories (Eskelinen et 
al., 2009). In this paper, I contribute to efforts to extend street-level bureaucracy 
theory to show that it is not only frontline workers who bring their agency to 
bear on street-level encounters, but also the people who are the supposed 
‘targets’ of policy, who can be active participants in public encounters and shape 
policy implementation through their creative engagements with bureaucratic 
systems (Barnes & Prior, 2009).  
 
This study also adds to the small but growing literature in Africa and developing 
countries more generally, on how frontline public service workers (Hoag, 2010; 
Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Olivier de Sardan, 2005, 2015; Blundo, 





Gibson, 2004; Walker & Gilson, 2004; Müller et al., 2016) shape how services 
are delivered and thus how policy is ‘realised’ on the ground.  
 
 
Research Methods and Context  
 
Data was collected in clinics and hospitals over a period of eleven months 
between 2013 and 2014 in the Western Cape Province of South Africa, in the 
Cape Town Metro and the West Coast and Winelands districts. At the time of 
fieldwork, DG assessments in the Western Cape were conducted at all levels of 
the healthcare system by both treating doctors (in hospitals) and dedicated 
SASSA assessors (in community clinics).  
 
I worked in twelve different community clinics in rural and urban areas, 
sampled to maximise demographic variation in terms of race and income. I also 
conducted fieldwork at three hospitals, one of which was a psychiatric hospital, 
working with doctors in the departments of cardiology, neurology, neurosurgery, 
orthopaedics, psychiatry and infectious diseases. 
  
Twenty-four doctors, who conducted DG assessments during the course of their 
work as treating doctors (12) or as dedicated SASSA assessors (12) were 
involved in the study. I directly observed the work of seventeen doctors over one 
or two days. In cases where direct observation was not appropriate or not 
possible, I conducted in-depth interviews with doctors. In total, 216 
consultations were observed, of which 196 were disability assessments. 
  
Over the course of the day, the doctor and I would discuss patient cases and the 
rationale for their decision-making, usually between patient consultations. 
Observing the doctor-patient interaction created opportunities to learn how 
doctors engaged with and examined patients, how patients presented both their 
medical and social cases to doctors and how doctors responded to patient 
behaviour and characteristics. At the end of the day I would conduct a more 
formal interview to reflect on the cases seen and address any remaining 
questions I had about their decision-making and general approach. Combining 
observation and interviews was useful in stimulating discussions with doctors 
that were grounded in the concrete particularities of real cases and provided 
opportunities for me to probe their understanding of DG cases. While a number 
of measures were taken to minimise the influence of my presence in the room, it 
is important to note that this may, nevertheless have had an influence on doctor-
patient interactions.  
 
Observing and participating in the collegial encounters between doctors, 





my understanding of the system. By speaking with claimants while we waited 
for the doctor to arrive, I gained more perspective on how claimants understand 
and navigate their way through the assessment process. This was 
complemented by ethnographic work on claimants’ perspectives on and 
attempts to access the DG conducted in 2012 in an impoverished urban 
community known as Blikkiesdorp4 in Delft, Cape Town (Kelly, 2012). Quotes 
from participants in this study are incorporated throughout this paper. 
 
Ethical approval for the study was received from the University of Cape Town 
Human Research Ethics Committee. In order to preserve the anonymity of the 




Relational dynamics, power and trust in doctor-
patient interactions 
 
The DG assessment, like all healthcare encounters, is a social exchange shaped 
by the power, relative agency and emotions of social actors involved in the 
interaction; the forms of communication; and the degree of trust that exists 
between them. These interactions are an important but understudied site in 
which conceptions about ‘deservingness’ of certain groups to public benefits 
such as social grants are elaborated and deployed (Horton, 2004). In general, 
relatively little attention has been paid to how the relational, situational and 
performative aspects of street-level encounters shape policy implementation 
(Bartels, 2013). Although power dynamics between doctors and patients have 
been studied extensively by medical sociologists, the power dynamics between 
patients and providers are often overlooked in terms of how they shape health 
policy implementation (Erasmus & Gilson, 2008). 
  
Although doctors’ work is subject to administrative and legal restraints, 
physicians have considerable power relative to claimants in the DG assessment. 
They have obvious gatekeeping and expert authority. This is reinforced by the 
ceremonial order and bureaucratic format of clinical encounters, which enables 
and supports the expression of medical authority (Strong, 1979). The notion that 
clinical encounters produce and reproduce asymmetries of power and 
knowledge is a well-established idea in medical sociology. Sociological 
critiques of medicalization in particular strongly emphasise the asymmetry 
between patient and doctor and often paint patients as victims (Lupton, 1997). 
While medical imperialism and the caricature of biomedicine put forward in the 
                                                 
4 ‘Blikkiesdorp’ means tin can town and refers to the zinc structures built by the provincial 





medicalization thesis 5 are exaggerated and not necessarily accurate in an age 
where lay people have more access to information and doctors’ work is 
increasingly regulated by corporations and the state (Williams, 2001; Kelly & 
Field, 1994 in Williams, 2001), significant power differentials continue to exist 
between doctor and patient in circumstances where patients are illiterate and 
poor (Crawford, 1999).  
 
This is often the case in DG assessments, where the fissures created by the 
history of apartheid continue to structure the South African public health system, 
entrenching the dominance and paternalistic role of doctors in their relationship 
with patients and relegating patients to a “submissive, compliant and reactive 
role” (Grant, 2006: 55; Saohatse 1998; Crawford 1999; Kane-Berman & 
Hickman, 2003). Doctor-patient interactions are interpersonal and the micro-
politics of these also reflect and perhaps (to some extent) support broader social 
relations (Waitzkin, 1991: 9). The interactions I observed between doctors and 
claimants were representative of the socio-cultural cleavages that exist in and 
define relations in broader South African society. These cleavages were created 
by class, race, educational and cultural differences which accentuate social 
distance between doctors and patients and encourage “performances of distance 
and domination” (Heyman, 2004: 492). The significant social and economic 
inequality between middle class doctors and poor patients contributed to power 
inequalities in the assessment. This resulted in doctors treating patients as what 
one doctor referred to as “poor unfortunates” (Dr Brown, interview, 2014 April 
4). 
 
Doctors’ decisions to recommend the award or renewal of grants can involve 
significant discretion and can have a large impact on the quality of life of 
patients living in poverty. This increases doctors already significant power 
relative to patients. In one study, doctors reported “feeling like God” when 
making decisions on whether or not to award or re-new grants (De Paoli et al., 
2012). 
 
Language and knowledge barriers amplify these inequalities. Watson et al. 
(2006) argue that applicants should take the central position in DG assessments 
and that they should have the opportunity to express their experiences, opinions 
and subjectively relevant information. In turn, assessors should strive to 
understand why claimants are applying and what their perceptions of function 
are. This was not often not the case in DG assessments I observed and SASSA 
doctors sometimes asked claimants very little about their experiences, leaving 
                                                 
5 Critics of medicalization argue that this power allows medicine to expand its authority to 
address social problems or forms of deviance from the norm. They argue that this makes 






them sit quietly in the room while the they filled out the forms – their presence 
almost a secondary part of the doctors’ work. As well as being a function of a 
doctors’ particular approach and time constraints, this was the result of the 
language barriers, illiteracy and claimants’ poor medical knowledge. In many 
cases I observed, both related and unrelated to the DG, it was obviously difficult 
for patients to articulate clearly and accurately their medical histories or 
functional limitations and to communicate their experiences in the way they 
wanted to. It also made it harder for doctors to ask patients questions about their 
conditions or explain SASSA processes and requirements to them, leaving many 
patients confused. 
  
Language barriers between doctors and patients are a general issue, which 
interferes with the clinical process at all levels of the healthcare system in South 
Africa (Swartz, 1998; Swartz & Drennan, 2000). The medical profession in 
South Africa is still predominantly dominated by white English and Afrikaans-
speaking doctors who are often unable to speak ‘African’ languages. These 
barriers make it difficult to build rapport with some patients. Schlemmer & 
Mash (2006) found that doctors resent and blame patients who can’t speak 
English. 
 
This can lead doctors to dehumanise patients and to practice what some South 
African scholars have called “veterinary medicine” (Crawford, 1999; 
Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2007; Swartz, 1998) – a type of medicine that does not 
consider patient engagement or voice as part of the practice of diagnosis or 
treatment. In the case of DG assessments in Cape Town, this puts Xhosa-
speaking claimants who did not speak the socially dominant languages of 
medicine at a distinct disadvantage, even when translation was used. This 
reinforced racial differences between black patients and white, ‘coloured’ and 
Indian doctors. 
 
Language barriers were particularly problematic at clinics and hospitals where 
there was a mix of patients from different racial and linguistic backgrounds and 
at the primary healthcare level where patient loads were higher, translation 
services seemed almost non-existent and doctors were time extremely time-
constrained. Although formal translation services are available in hospitals, they 
were infrequently used. In most cases where translation was necessary, nurses, 
administrative staff, and even other patients, were drawn into the room to 
translate. Both finding and using a translator can be time consuming and 
frequently SASSA assessors (and occasionally treating doctors) chose to 
stumble through consultations without translators, focusing on the contents of 
file rather than interacting with the patient. This disempowered patients and 






A lack of medical knowledge and information about SASSA’s eligibility criteria 
also hampered claimants’ ability to present their case to doctors. For instance, 
when doctors asked patients why they were applying for the grant or why they 
could not work, many claimants (particularly first-time applicants) did not 
understand that doctors were interested in hearing about their medical 
complaints, how these impaired them and prevented them from working. Social 
workers at a psychiatric hospital explained that some psychiatric patients would 
apply on the basis of old scars or injuries, rather than their psychiatric conditions 
because physical impairment was easier for them to explain to doctors than their 
experiences of mental illness. 
  
In contrast, patients who could communicate with the doctor in their own 
language or at least had a good command of English or Afrikaans or were more 
educated were better able to actively participate in and shape the nature of the 
assessment. Doctors, in turn, were able to develop better rapport with these 
patients and were more receptive to their claims. Similar findings have been 
made in numerous other healthcare (Horton, 2004; Porter, 1990; Beach et al., 
2006) and welfare programme settings (Kriz & Skivenes, 2010; Jonsson, 
1998). 
 
Communication challenges also prevented the development of trusting 
relationships between doctors and patients. In her work on trust in healthcare 
systems in South Africa, Gilson (2003: 1453) argued that “health systems are 
inherently relational” and reliant on trust. Trust, or in this case, lack of trust the 
in healthcare relationship, can either reduce or reinforce inequalities in health 
sector relationships (Ostergaard, 2015). There are a number of studies in South 
Africa on providers who do not trust patients and therefore treat them in harsh 
and uncaring ways (Jewkes et al., 1998; Oskowitz et al., 1997; Walker & 
Gilson, 2004). In turn, patients may be suspicious of doctors who do not show 
empathy or are rude or moralising towards patients and insensitive in their use 
of discretionary power (Ostergaard, 2015).  
 
The process of DG assessment itself promotes distrust. Disability testing is 
based on the assumption that people are likely to misrepresent themselves in 
order to meet the categorical tests of welfare programmes or for other secondary 
gains. The political and economic privileges and exemptions that come with 
being categorised as disabled mean that disability is commonly understood to 
exist in both genuine and artificial forms and the suspicion that people will 
malinger (feign or exaggerate impairment) is integral to how disability is both 
defined and understood (Stone, 1984: 28). It is part of a doctor’s role to be alert 
to and guard fraud, but there is also an implicitly moral judgment made about 
the archetypal malingerer or faker – people who one doctor called ‘chancers and 





Subjective understandings vs. expert 
knowledge of disability  
 
Patients’ conceptions of disability, which were often different from the formal 
definitions used by SASSA, are also important in understanding the doctor-
patient interaction. Claimants interpret policy (for instance eligibility criteria) 
based on information they receive from SASSA, past experience, various 
healthcare professionals, what they see in communities (who is receiving 
grants), and information that is shared by other claimants. 
  
Strictly applied, the impairment-based model used during assessments can also 
exclude people who struggle with facial disfigurement, albinism, chronic 
illnesses (especially stigmatised illness such as HIV/AIDS or epilepsy) or so-
called hidden disabilities. In these cases their disability and related labour 
market exclusion, is created more by slack labour demand or societal prejudice 
than medically-measurable impairment. However, the disabling nature of these 
conditions as experienced by individuals is no less real than those caused by 
physical impairment. Allocating the DG to people with particular impairments 
and not people with chronic illnesses, who may also struggle to find work or 
cope with the costs associated with the direct and indirect costs of illness even 
with free access to primary healthcare (Goudge, 2009) can appear arbitrary to 
claimants and communities. 
  
Based on questions claimants asked doctors and myself, it seemed that many 
claimants did not understand why some people would receive grants and others 
would not, why they would receive a temporary grant from one doctor and not 
another, or why their eligibility would change from one application to another. 
In Blikkiesdorp there also appeared to be no clear delineation in people’s 
minds between who should and should not receive the grant except the doctor’s 
decision. As a result there was some confusion around what pathologies made 
one eligible for the grant, resulting in many people applying without 
necessarily fitting biomedical definitions of disability. Other studies have found 
that patients think that because they are receiving medication or have a file at 
the clinic that they are eligible for a grant (Macgregor, 2006). This was echoed 
by doctors in this study. Some people I spoke with in the settlement of 
Blikkiesdorp had similar understandings of grant eligibility: 
  
‘They say I say I must go and see the doctor in February and maybe I 
am also going to get a grant because I am on my tablets for my heart, 
my sugar [diabetes] and the water [blood pressure]. I get the tablets 






People also understood the DG as a form of social relief for any unemployed 
person who received regular medical treatment. One doctor told me: “If you are 
unemployed and have a folder at the clinic then people think that they can apply 
and people think that being on medication means you are eligible for the grant”.  
 
SASSA does not communicate eligibility criteria to the public and assessing 
doctors are not in a position to correct misinformation by explaining eligibility 
criteria to ineligible claimants because they are discouraged from telling 
claimants about whether or not they qualify to protect them from possible 
patient retaliation. This perpetuated confusion around eligibility and the 
perception that the grant system is arbitrary and unfair. One doctor told me that 
patients would often ask him, “have I been lucky doctor?” at the end of their 
assessment. The idea that DG applications are a game of chance, speaks to the 
subjective nature of the assessment process and the confusion this has created 
amongst the public. 
 
Misperceptions about eligibility criteria were also fuelled by the previous lack 
of regulation and standardisation around eligibility and ongoing differential 
application of eligibility criteria by doctors. Expectations of support created by 
previous applications of the DG category, which communicated a fairly 
generous idea of what disability ‘is’, have been difficult for SASSA to correct 
(Kelly, 2013). Street-level bureaucrats’ categorising work can influence and 
reconfigure power relations, social identities and ideas about deservingness as 
they interact with citizens (Yanow, 2003) and the DG shows how important the 
historical application of an administrative category by street-level bureaucrats is 
in creating expectations about who should rightfully be included in that 
category. Framing eligibility differently, some doctors continued to recommend 
grants to patients to support health outcomes, in recognition of the challenges 
that older people and unskilled people with minor impairments face in the labour 
market or because they see particular individuals as deserving of support (see 
Kelly, 2016). This has not only resulted uneven application of policy, but also 
perpetuates the idea that doctors’ decision-making can be influenced by 
claimants. 
   
These misconceptions about eligibility criteria also appeared to be driven by 
fundamentally different understanding of what it means to be disabled. In 
medicine, “proof” of disease lies in biomarkers - objective, quantifiable and 
comparable indicators of a patient’s medical condition – (e.g. CD4 count, viral 
load, cholesterol level, blood pressure, ejection fraction or insulin level) which 
indicate the presence and severity of a disease, as well as treatment response. 
Although not directly connected to impairment, these details, written in 





interpretation of disability on the other hand is based on their daily experiences 
of suffering and sickness and their experiences of struggling to find work. 
  
‘I tried to do it again when my CD4 was up but they said no, now you 
are better, you must go look for the jobs you see. I feel sad because 
I’m not working and I don’t have a husband and I have kids at home 
you see. I was sad and I don’t find jobs. They look only for if it is 
under 200. It didn’t matter whether you are taking tablets, whether 
you are suffering, they only say you can get it when your CD4 count 
is under 200’ (Nomakhwezi, Blikkiesdorp, 2012). 
 
Various studies in South Africa have demonstrated that lay constructions of 
disability and illness and DG eligibility differ from the narrow bureaucratic and 
medicalised definitions of eligibility (Reynolds & Swartz, 1993; Delany et al., 
2005; Segar, 1994; Macgregor, 2006; Kelly, 2012). In their ethnographic work 
in the Eastern Cape, Hansen & Sait (2012: 100) encountered people who had 
“talk[ed] themselves into disability” and who understood illness, impairment, 
poverty and distress as disability, even if their embodied experience of 
suffering did not fit the biomedical definition of disability. Patients tend to 
experience disease in terms of function and their daily activities and 
experiences and citizens generally tend to express their experiences as 
individual problems and want their personal experiences to be taken 
seriously (Lipsky, 2010: 60; Prottass, 1979; Soss, 1999). This need stands in 
sharp contrast to the reductive and objectifying nature of the disability 
assessment. Doctors, on the other hand, tend to think more about patterns of 
disease (Mechanic, 1995: 1208) and biomedical definitions of disability do not 
take personal experiences and related suffering into account (Kleinman & 
Kleinman, 1991; Kleinman, 1995). 
 
 
Forms of contestation, resistance and 
insubordination 
 
Although doctors tended to dominate the assessment because of their 
professional and social status and decision-making power, DG claimants were 
not necessarily subordinate or passive victims in their interactions with doctors 
or without options or strategies. 
 
De Certeau (1984) and Scott (1985, 1990, 2009) have both argued that the 
powerless are not necessarily passive or docile and that small, tactical acts of 
defiance in everyday life can be used to resist forces of power. In Asylums, 





their personhood resist the categorization and stripping of the ‘self’ within 
institutions. A number of other ethnographic studies (Skalnik, 1989) have shown 
that people employ what James Scott has described as “weapons of the weak” 
(1985) or “arts of resistance” (1990) and what de Certeau (1984) calls “tactics” 
or “arts of the weak” – small, everyday and often unnoticeable forms of 
resistance to systems of domination that show the limits of power, but which are 
often short-lived in their effects. 
  
Prior & Barnes (2009; 2011) have shown that citizens may attempt to assert 
their position by engaging in relational or oppositional struggles with street -level 
bureaucrats or by trying to subvert bureaucratic systems and processes. They 
argue that the subversion of policy directives and disruption of bureaucratic 
processes in public service settings is driven by “agencies of resistance” of both 
street-level bureaucrats and service users. While scholars of policy 
implementation have paid significant attention to the subversive actions of 
frontline workers, acts of resistance by citizens and clients in bureaucratic 
encounters and its effect on policy outcomes has been less studied. Clients do 
not always accept being placed in administrative categories and may work to 
assert their agency in street-level interactions by subverting or disrupting 
existing systems, developing alternative strategies and practices or refusing to 
participate in systems and programmes in the way institutions and bureaucrats 
want them to (Dubois, 2010; Barnes & Prior, 2011). This can result in 
distinctively different outcomes than those intended. 
  
For example, in his work in French welfare offices, Dubois (2010) observed 
cases where clients would defy the bureaucratic attempts to place them into 
administrative categories through personalisation - attempting to gain control of 
the interaction by creating cracks in the bureaucratic or professional façade of 
bureaucrats or introducing an emotional dimension into interactions through 
narratives of misery. There are a number of other examples of this in European 
studies (Bloor & Macintosh, 1990; Salmon & May, 1995; McDonald & 
Marston, 2005; Ewick & Silbey, 2003). In South Africa, Schneider et al. (2010) 
showed that patients negotiated access to care and preserved their dignity in a 
resource-constrained public hospital by making tactical use of social networks, 
complaint mechanisms, narratives of resistance and becoming expert, compliant 
patients. Also in South Africa, Eyles et al. (2015) argue that patients may resist 
poor treatment by healthcare providers within the healthcare system through 
non-compliance with treatment which, even despite the potential for self-harm, 
represents an exercise of agency which can be a coping mechanism for 
navigating the healthcare system and their relationships within it. 
 
Observations of doctor-patient interactions showed that during DG assessments 





their stories and bodies to doctors, along with it their own understandings and 
interpretations of SASSA’s eligibility criteria. Some patients actively resisted 
doctors’ dominance and attempted to assert their personhood and demands for 
inclusion in the social security system. One way of doing this was drawing on 
one’s biology and convincing doctors of the severity of their medical problems 
by performing their genuine, somatic or feigned impairments to doctors. 
Another was by presenting narratives of their experiences of poverty and related 
social and psychic suffering, in the hope of soliciting a humanitarian response 
from doctors who might stretch or abandon SASSA’s eligibility criteria to 
include them. These ‘modes’ of resistance are not necessarily conscious or 
intentional and also have a practical component: survival. Being assessed as 
disabled provides access to an income via the DG and disability therefore 
becomes a resource and opportunity for a connection to the state (Petryna, 
2004). 
 
It is important to note that not all claimants resisted the assessment process and I 
am not attempting to distinguish between acts of compliance and resistance in 
terms of agency, because accepting the rule can also be a form of agency 
(Hansson & Hellberg, 2015: 31). There is of course also a risk of overstating the 
agency of claimants and over-interpreting DG claimants’ behaviour and self-
expressions and labelling them as resistance, or assuming that there is a unity in 
how the ‘weak’ think, which is assumed to be antagonistic to power, criticism 
that has been levelled at Scott and de Certeau (Gupta, 2001; Johansson & 
Vinthagen, 2014; Howe, 1998). In fact, perhaps one of the most effective way of 
negotiating access to the grant was by being compliant, well-mannered and 
demonstrating through appropriate behaviour that one was a ‘decent’ and 
therefore ‘deserving’ person (Kelly, 2016). Harris et al., (2014), for instance, 
showed that patient compliance and deference and docility in interactions with 
healthcare staff was a path to inclusion in the South African healthcare contract 
which the authors interpreted as neither automatically nor unconditionally 
inclusive. 
  
The interaction that took place between Mr Khaya, a 33 year-old former miner 
and Dr Marais, at an orthopaedic outpatient clinic at a Cape Town hospital 
presents a good example of a patient using physical performance of disability to 
assert his demand for a DG. Mr Khaya, a new patient at the clinic, entered the 
room limping and wearing a knee brace incorrectly – it was only half tied up and 
upside down and he clearly had no need for it. He was there on the premise that 
he was seeking treatment for his knee, but Dr Marais very quickly said to me, 
“he’s not here for an operation, he’s here for a grant – have you not noticed by 
now?” and busied himself with administration work for some time before 
addressing the patient. This was quite uncharacteristic of him because he had 





to be avoiding what he expected to be an awkward interaction. Khaya could not 
understand any English and a nurse was brought in to translate. She explained to 
Marais that Khaya had been injured during strike action in Rustenberg where he 
had been a miner and he had ataxia (poor balance) as a result of a head injury. 
He had been medically boarded in 2011 because he had Stage 4 AIDS and had 
been paid out R104 000, but this money was now finished. He told the doctor 
that he was looking for money from SASSA because he was not working. He 
claimed that he had tuberculosis, but he was not receiving treatment for it or his 
HIV because he had moved from Philippi to Khayelitsha and did not know 
where the clinic was. 
 
On examination, it appeared that there was nothing wrong with Mr Khaya’s 
knee, he did however have a sore on his hip and he appeared underweight and 
unwell. The doctor asked Khaya what he wanted and he responded that if his leg 
could be healed then he would work, but if it could not be healed then he would 
like a grant. He added that one of his legs was shorter than the other. Dr Marais 
told me that he was frustrated because he was not sure what the patient wanted 
and whether he could help him as his problems were clearly not orthopaedic, 
despite him claiming that they were. He said to the nurse [a different one by this 
point], “tell him that no doctor can fix his legs and that he needs to see a doctor 
for the HIV because this is his main problem at the moment”. He told Mr Khaya 
that he could “get a grant” because of the HIV and the problems related to it. He 
did not, however, conduct any real assessment of his HIV status. Khaya grinned 
widely and he and the nurse spoke in Xhosa for some time. The nurse then 
shared this conversation with the doctor, saying that Khaya had told her that Dr 
Marais had agreed to lend him money. Dr Marais was very amused because no 
such discussion had taken place. The nurse spoke to Khaya again and he 
reiterated that Marais had agreed to lend him money. Dr Marais told the nurse 
that he never lent or gave patients money and, clearly annoyed, got some pills 
from his bag, explaining he that he was getting a migraine. After speaking more 
with Khaya, the nurse told Dr Marais that because he was white, people thought 
he had money. Whilst we waited for the DG book to arrive, the nurse carried on 
chatting with Khaya. She didn’t seem to think that the Mr Khaya was unjustified 
in his expectation and joked with him: “instant loan”. When Dr Mara is finally 
filled out the form he wrote that Mr Khaya had pulmonary TB, a previous head 
injury and HIV and recommended a permanent grant without review, clearly 
never wanting him to return. When Mr Khaya got up to leave, the doctor told 
him to leave his knee brace behind because he didn’t need it anymore. 
 
In this case, almost in collaboration with the nurse, Mr Khaya was able to assert 
his demand for a grant quite directly, resisting the inherent power disparities 
between him, the poor black man who could not speak English and the wealthy, 





non-compliant and feigning illness. Although claimants were seldom so 
successful in doing this, he succeeded in wearying the doctor to the point that he 
recommended the grant simply to get rid of him. Dr Marais admitted that he 
appeased patients in this way fairly often and I also observed him advising a 
junior doctor who was being pressurised by one of her own patients to 
recommend a temporary grant if the patient continued to insist on it. 
 
As in the case of Mr Khaya, who used an old knee brace as a prop in his 
performance of disability, feigning or exaggerating impairments was a 
commonly used tactic by claimants. Another doctor summed up this scenario 
quite well: “If you cannot find work then you remember that you have an old 
injury”. Although extremely difficult to determine whether in fact it is the case, 
healthcare workers believed that they encountered large numbers of people who 
were evidently not disabled on the basis of objective medical criteria. There were 
a number of cases where doctors and OTs had witnessed claimants who had 
accidentally revealed that they were not in fact impaired or as impaired as they 
claimed when they were not being observed. 
  
‘I saw recently a patient also, she couldn't walk and she was walking 
like this [demonstrates someone walking hunched over] inside the 
room, but I know her because I was working at Driefontein. When 
she left [the room] I gave her a chance, say 5 seconds, before I 
looked at her down the passage - she was walking normally’ (Dr 
Bury, interview, 22 July 2014). 
 
Knowing that doctors were interested in medical diagnoses and treatment 
history, some claimants would arrive at the assessment with a long list of 
symptoms and complaints based on anything they had received treatment for in 
the past – from asthma, to arthritis to healed fractures (Dr Jacobs, interview, 24 
October 2013). According to doctors and occupational therapists, back pain, 
osteoarthritis and pain from old injuries were most commonly exaggerated or 
feigned by claimants. Officials working for SASSA indicated that there were 
cases where claimants borrowed medication or mobility aids from others to 
attempt to fraudulently access the grant, but this was difficult by the need for 
supporting evidence in the medical file and did not seem to be a frequent 
occurrence. Occupational therapists also highlighted the frequency with which 
DG applicants that had been referred to them by doctors for formal work 
assessment exaggerated their disablement or intentionally underperformed on 
mobility, motor or functional tests. 
  
‘The person will say that they are in pain, but you can give them test 
like the ramp and the stairs to do and they will have no indicators of 





will tell you they are not in pain but they will SAY they are in pain, 
even though they are still doing the exercise underneath the normal 
times taken,  they are not using the railings, there’s no abnormal 
gait pattern - those type of things. If they know that we are testing 
them they will excessively walk much slower on the stairs and then 
we'll record the time, but they don't realise that we are still assessing 
them during tea and lunchtime’ (Occupational therapist, interview, 23 
April 2014). 
 
Claimants with epilepsy were generally aware that only uncontrolled cases of 
epilepsy are eligible for the DG and because the frequency of their fits was 
difficult to authenticate, some exaggerated the number of seizures they had per 
month. Social workers at a psychiatric hospital reported that claimants frequently 
‘relapsed’ shortly before their grants expired. This was not only a perception 
held by healthcare professionals. In Blikkiesdorp, community members eagerly 
shared examples of people receiving grants who were not (in their eyes) 
genuinely disabled. 
  
‘She will perform, fall, pee and make all the different things and the 
doctor will believe that she’s not normal and she will bite him and 
perform and be angry and do all the movements. Then she would 
come to me and tell me all the movements she was doing for the 
doctor! I was laughing! People are very clever; people think that if 
they stay in Delft they are illiterate but they are very clever’ (Delft 
Community Development Worker, Interview, 2012). 
 
Many of the people applying for grants on “false” premises had received 
temporary grants in the past but had not found work after these grants had lapsed 
and were looking for new opportunities to re-new these grants and maintain their 
income. For patients, the prospect of losing their monthly income was 
devastating. The temporary grant system assumes that once someone’s health 
has recovered that they should be able to re-enter the labour market. This creates 
incentives to prolong one’s time in the sick role because very often claimants are 
not much more employable after they recovered than they were when they first 
received a grant. 
   
Although defaulting on treatment may have presented a strategy for retaining a 
temporary disability grant in the past, few doctors now recommend grants for 
people who do not adhere to treatment. 
  
As deception by claimants is a central concern in disability benefit 
administration, doctors were alert to the possibility that patients were 





as exaggerating or feigning symptoms, made doctors alert to and suspicious of 
patients’ motivations in reporting their symptoms and lived experiences of 
disability during DG assessments. This meant that these performances were 
seldom convincing to doctors, and could result in an impatient reaction by 
doctors who classified the patient as a ‘malingerer’. Even so, by disrupting the 
assessment, patients undermined doctors’ authority and introduced a kind of 
uncertainty that in some cases resulted in doctors recommending temporary 
grant, sometimes simply to get a patient to leave. 
  
Besides the relatively small a group of people who at least appeared to be 
intentionally trying to deceive doctors, there were people with what doctors 
considered relatively minor impairments who appeared to genuinely believe 
they were disabled based on their lived experience. Self-perceptions of disability 
may not always align with objective observations of health or disability status 
(Monks, 2000: 19). “Suffering is an affliction of the person, not the body” 
(Cassell, 2004: xii) and people conceive of and experience disability and illness 
differently, displaying different “illness behaviour”, responding to bodily 
indications, interpreting symptoms and taking action in often very different ways 
(Mechanic, 1995). Feelings of disablement can also be somatic in origin. 
According to OTs I interviewed, who often spent days with patients during 
formal work assessments, some patients felt more disabled by their medical 
impairments than functional assessments would suggest. 
  
‘I get a lot of women that have come in here because of abuse - like 
they are broken because of abuse and you can actually see it in their 
entire demeanour already, the way they dress, the way their hair is, 
the way they smell. We do get patients that look horrible, they look 
really worn out, so life has kind taken from them, just in general - 
whether it be other people that have broken them down or 
circumstances that have broken them down or maybe they are just 
negative people - you get pessimistic people. So there’s a lot of 
reasons why their motivation is not where it should be to return to 
go out and seek work. They feel like they are victimised, they feel 
like they just are...they can't do anything’ (OT1, interview, 23 April 
2014). 
 
Physical pain and suffering that is not connected with or disproportionate to 
physiological problems can be driven by somatisation, which is a bodily mode 
of experiencing personal and political distress (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1991: 
280). “Both physical and emotional pain can be increased by fear, 
powerlessness, anxiety, depression, and lack of control” (Francis, 2006). 
Individuals with low self-esteem and motivation as a result of their life 





convinced that they are not able to work (Mechanic, 1995) and both doctors and 
occupational therapists recognised that low motivation drove perceptions of 
disablement.  
 
In another study of DG applications in South Africa, Macgregor (2006) found 
that claimants in the Cape Town township of Khayelitsha somatised the stresses 
of their economic and social circumstances, expressing their suffering as a 
psychiatric condition they called “nerves”, a local term which she sees as 
“embodying the distress associated with harsh circumstances and is deemed by 
supplicants as sufficient to secure a grant”. Mary, a research participant in 
Blikkiesdorp, who was an HIV positive single mother who had been sexually 
abused and continued to face physical and emotional abuse from her drug-
addicted daughter, somatised her anxiety in terms of her HIV status, describing 
her stress in terms of her falling CD4 count. Although not connected to attempts 
to obtain social benefits, Fullwiley (2006) describes how Senegalese women 
carrying the sickle-cell trait (a benign condition with no symptoms) articulated 
their emotional, social and physical suffering as “sickle cell crisis”. Fullwiley 
theorises that this enunciation of suffering in biological form is an expression of 
biosocial suffering, an idea drawn from Rabinow’s concept of biosociality 
(1992) and Kleinman et al.’s (1997) concept of social suffering. Scheper-
Hughes (2002) argues illness can be used as a “passive aggressive weapon of the 
weak” and that malingering and somatisation are “inchoate acts of protest and 
defiance against oppressive roles and/or feelings of inadequacy, frustration, or 
failure” (2002: 153-169). The desire to assume the “sick role” and refusing to 
continue to look for work also represents another more passive kind of 
resistance, “a refusal to endure, to cope”. It says, “I will not any longer” 
(Hopper, 1982 in Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1986). 
 
As the disabled body is entitled to support from the state, disability becomes a 
positive collective category people can draw on to assert demands on the state as 
suffering bodies and form of ‘opportunity’ because it has the potential to offer 
some kind of income (Hansen & Sait, 2012; Kelly, 2012). In other words, 
claimants embraced impairment and medicalisation as a route to social 
inclusion. One doctor in this study noted that in cases of long-term 
unemployment, claimants people thought of hypertension and diabetes as a 
“bonus”, because they believed their diagnosis would allow them to receive a 
grant (Dr Bhele, interview, 30 April 2014). Others have provided examples of 
people reacting positively to an HIV or TB diagnosis, or, although not 
necessarily something carried out in practice, wanting to remain ill (Leclerc-
Madlada, 2006; Nattrass, 2006; Hardy & Richter, 2006; Delany et al., 2005; 
Nattrass, 2006; Hardy & Richter, 2006; De Paoli et al., 2012; Woolgar, 2014; 
Segar, 1994). This has been characterised as a “bizarre sickness-poverty trap” 





While the field of disability studies has avoided considering the impairment 
related aspects of disability in examining the politics of inclusion, medical 
anthropologists have considered disability-related claims on the state in 
Foucauldian terms as biopolitical. There is now a fairly substantial literature 
using disability or illness as a resource and opportunity for a connection to the 
state (Petryna, 2004, 2002; Ticktin, 2006; Fassin, 2001, 2009; Nguyen, 2010, 
2013). Petryna defines this type of embodied demand for support from the state 
as biological citizenship – a link to “a form of social welfare based on medical, 
scientific and legal criteria that both acknowledge biological injury and 
compensate for it” (2002: 6). 
  
Embodiment was not the only way that claimants expressed their suffering and 
performed the role of ‘deserving’ disabled person. DG claimants’ accounts of 
their disablement were very often expressed as narratives of their everyday 
struggles of trying to find work, difficult household dynamics and experiences 
of living in poverty, rather than as descriptions of medical symptoms or physical 
limitations. In some cases claimants combined this storytelling with other 
physical complaints, as was the case with Mrs Nkosana. She began her 
performance as soon as she entered Dr Mulumba’s office. With one hand on her 
back and the other hand on the table, she lowered herself carefully into the chair, 
complaining loudly and dramatically about her backache. When asked why she 
was applying for a grant, Mrs Nkosana told the doctor that for seven years she 
had had “no food and no job” and had “been waiting for a grant” since 2008. 
She went on to tell Dr Mulumba that she had “terrible diabetes”. After 
discussing Nkosana’s medical history and treatment for a while, Mulumba 
began to fill out the assessment form. While she did this, Nkosana started to tell 
her about what a terrible disease the “sugar” was. She also described her 
incontinence, saying that when she went back to the Eastern Cape she had to use 
babies’ nappies because she was “leaking”. Dr Mulumba was only half listening 
and did not respond to this storytelling, focusing her attention on the form in 
front of her instead. 
 
Recognising this, Mrs Nkosana turned and, hoping for some more sympathy 
from me, complained that her back was sore. Trying to avoid becoming 
involved, I simply nodded. She was not deterred and added that she also 
couldn’t see properly. Dr Mulumba intervened by looking up from her 
paperwork and telling her that she needed to glasses and that she should see 
someone about this. Mrs Nkosana was not so easily dismissed and started 
complaining that her nose was running and that it gave her a headache and made 
a knocking noise in her head, rapping on the table to demonstrate. Dr Mulumba 
asked her if she had always had sinus problems and Nkosana responded with a 
complex story about leaving work because of her back pain. Mulumba asked 





knees were also a problem: “Yoh,6 my knees are stiff! Sometimes I leave the 
table and I have no food inside and I say, ‘Hey Jesus, you must look after me’”. 
The doctor asked Nkosana where her husband was. “Yoh, yoh, yoh!” exclaimed 
Nkosana. She then continued to tell the doctor about how her husband had 
retired and returned to the Eastern Cape without her: “He sweet talks you nicely 
– I hate him. That is why I am getting the diabetes”. She added that her daughter 
has been smoking and drinking since 2003 - “that is why life is so terrible”. In 
her story, her physical struggles were closely tied to her social and economic 
ones and she invoked both in describing her ‘deservingness’.  
 
Although like Mrs Nkosana, many patients employed pathos to strengthen their 
cases, this story-telling was not necessarily intended to manipulate or deceive 
doctors and may simply represent, as in Hansen & Sait’s study (2012), a 
different understanding of disablement or a sharing of experience. It does, 
nevertheless, represent a demand for social assistance. 
  
While these patient narratives were ignored or shut-down by many doctors, they 
made others made profoundly uncomfortable in their role. One Xhosa-speaking 
doctor explained how the shared language allowed many claimants to convey their 
stories in great detail she found it very painful to reject people knowing their 
social circumstances: “But then you still put ‘no’ at the end – it’s not nice. We 
are human beings also”. She described driving through the squatter camps to the 
clinic and told me, “you feel it, you know it, but you don’t have grounds to give 
the grant. As a doctor you choose this profession to help people, not to be 
unkind”. 
 
Although less frequently, claimants also asserted their demands and frustrations 
by verbally harassing or using violence against healthcare workers as a form of 
protest against the system; disrupting power relations by making them feel 
vulnerable. In interviews, as well as training sessions I attended, doctors 
frequently raised safety concerns or shared stories of patients that had threatened 
or verbally abused them either in an attempt to coerce them into recommending 
the grant or to express their anger at what they saw as unfair treatment. Doctors 
attributed attacks to poor screening practices and poor communication of 
eligibility criteria and the decision-making role of doctors, which led to doctors 
being blamed: “I wish the community was educated – we become the bad doctor 
and they are always on our necks”. 
 
Aggression by patients was experienced most commonly at the primary 
healthcare level by doctors who spend hours presenting the ‘face’ of SASSA to 
                                                 






disability grant claimants. These SASSA assessors were often intensely 
unpopular with patients because they were perceived as strict and inflexible. 
They were not only coerced by claimants during consultations, but were 
sometimes heckled by people waiting in the corridors. One doctor described 
how people in the corridors of the clinics she visited would regularly swear at 
her, complaining: “It’s not even her money!”. She had also threatened with a 
knife at two of the clinics she worked at and had also had a patient return to the 
clinic to confront her aggressively after learning from SASSA that his 
application had been rejected. She felt that doctors were often blamed for not 
“giving” the grant and that patients “made it personal”, not understanding that 
their decisions were based on SASSA’s guidelines. 
  
In another case, Dr Kruger, a SASSA assessor, was physically assaulted by an 
angry patient who had hit him with a chair during a consultation. He told me via 
email, “I have been verbally abused a few times and had patients scream at me 
and get quite aggressive, but I was never physically abused until now”. When he 
pressed charges and reported it to a senior SASSA doctor in the region where he 
worked, he was told that he was the third doctor in the region to be assaulted by 
a patient. This treatment was not limited to doctors and nurses and occupational 
therapists also experienced verbal threats and physical abuse from patients. Dr 
Marais shared the story of the nurse who managed his clinic who had 
encountered a patient at a local shopping mall who believed that she had 
discouraged Dr Marais from recommending a grant. The patient had chased the 
nurse through the mall, insulting and attempting to hit her. Occupational 
therapists, who are effectively included in the gatekeeping process by doctors 
who refer patients for functional assessments, reportedly also encountered 
considerable coercive pressure from patients who swore, shouted and threw 
objects at them.7 
 
Dubois (2010) puts forward three possible reasons why welfare claimants may 
use or threaten violence in administrative settings. It can be a resort of victims of 
structural violence who don’t understand the system, are frustrated by it and 
aren’t able to express themselves in  other ways. Violence can also be 
strategically employed to get attention or expedite bureaucratic processes. It can 
also be used by people as a way to demonstrate their personhood and their 
existence beyond administrative categories. 
  
In the case of the DG, aggression by claimants seemed to be mainly driven by 
frustration and anger at a system that was confusing and unfair or how they were 
                                                 
7  An OT at a work assessment unit at a tertiary hospital indicated that they often get 
inappropriate referrals from OTs working at PHC level in what she described as “dangerous 






treated by doctors, who could be rude and moralising in their interactions with 
claimants. One claimant, for example, shared her experience of being told by a 
doctor: “You are robbing the government, you must go work”. She had 
responded by swearing at him, which she felt was a legitimate response to being 
treated so rudely. Her reaction also represents claimants’ frustrations at being 
“misrecognised” (Fraser, 2008: 58) by doctors who treat them as lazy shirkers 
unworthy of both grants and their respect, rather than as equal citizens in need of 
support to achieve parity of participation. Participants in Blikkiesdorp indicated 
that people who had applied for grants felt unheard and unfairly treated by 
doctors and the system more generally (Kelly, 2012).  
 
‘I had to be fed with a spoon, even to eat, okay. I was taken to the 
disability doctor in a wheelchair. Firstly I went with the ambulance up 
and then I was placed into a wheelchair - was I approved? No. I 
waited and I waited and I waited and I was found fit. I was only bone 
and skin. Another time I asked the doctor “Do you think I will be 
approved?” because she was, quite frankly, shall I say teasing me in 
the jokes she was making. I said to her “Do you think I will get it?” 
and she said to me “No but you are still young, you can work”. I said, 
“you know what, if I stand up and I walk from here to that door then 
you will probably phone the guys at trauma to fetch me because my 
chest won’t only be tight, I will be a really extreme trauma case”. She 
said to me “Ag man, everybody says this stuff” and I said “Can’t you 
see in my file?” And she said, sir, “You’ve got to come up with better 
things than this for me to approve you”’ (Samuel, focus group, 
Blikkiesdorp, 2012). 
 
They expressed frustration with the government and the increasing difficulty of 
accessing benefits and could not understand why they were not physically 
examined (this is not a legal requirement and many doctors rely only on the 
claimants file) or why doctors told them they were capable of working when 
their daily experiences with illness and inability to find work indicated 
otherwise. One participant in that study joked, “if you die in the hospital today 
and they give you a death certificate then they will say ‘okay now you are fit for 
the disability’” (Kelly, 2012: 101). Not being told by doctors whether they 
qualified, left claimants them waiting in limbo for the two weeks before they 
could return to SASSA to have their applications processed, created significant 
stress and  for failed applications, significant time and money wasted on 
“bureaucratic run-around” for other parts of the application process such as 
means testing. 
  
‘The doctors are very strict because they don’t care, no matter you are 





don’t tell you if they give you the grant or they didn’t give you. You 
are struggling, you are doing the grant, you walk up and down, you do 
the grants and then to at the end there is nothing in the machine’ 
(Nomakhwezi, interview, Blikkiesdorp 2012). 
 
Aggression towards claimants also represents a bigger breakdown in the doctor-
patient relationship and trust in doctors, where doctors are seen as functionaries 
of the state; their work as arbitrary and corruptible as those of other 
administrators. China has seen a similar but much more widespread 
phenomenon, where the doctor-patient relationship and respect for and trust in 
doctors has deteriorated to such an extent that doctors are frequently violently 
attacked by patients and their families (Beam, 2014). 
 
  
How doctors respond to acts of resistance 
 
Claimants’ attempts to disrupt the assessment process made doctors’ already 
work difficult significantly more challenging. It was often difficult for doctors to 
react objectively and professionally in cases where this occurred and there is 
clearly an unavoidable emotional component to the type of face-to-face 
encounters that occur during DG assessments (Graham, 2002; Eggebø, 2013). 
Doctors are “emotional actors” (Hunter, 2015), who may feel interest and 
boredom, compassion and guilt, fear and detachment, sadness and fulfilment, 
anger at being manipulated or at people abusing the system and guilt during their 
interactions with clients (Tumbo, 2008; Eggebø, 2013; Graham, 2002; Rousseau 
& Foxen, 2010; Fassin, 2005; Butt, 2002; Ticktin, 2006) and like other street-
level bureaucrats, may develop their own approaches or routines for handling the 
stresses that accompany their work (Fassin, 2008; Walker & Gilson, 2004).  
 
As their interactions with patients are one of the most significant sources of 
stress, doctors developed coping strategies or social defence mechanisms 
(Menzies Lyth, 1960) to preserve their professional objectivity, protect 
themselves psychologically and manage the demands of their emotional and 
decision-making work. This included guarding against people looking to 
manipulate or trick them, dealing with people who the DG system could not 
accommodate and managing aggressive patients.  
 
In many cases, patient’s real problems extended well beyond doctors’ ability to 
assist them and unable to deal with people’s poverty they may become 
frustrated, despondent, disinterested, suffering from burn-out or compassion 
fatigue. Lipsky (2010) argues that street-level bureaucrats stereotype and 
mentally discount clients to rationalise their inability to assist and in the context 





simplify or justify their decision-making. In the South African healthcare system 
healthcare workers are overburdened and resources are limited and in this 
context clinicians have to make decisions that are not always ideal (Gibson, 
2004). As a result, decisions have to be made as to who is more ‘deserving’ of 
support, which can lead to moralizing about certain categories of people (Le 
Marcis & Grard, 2015; Walker & Gilson, 2004; Fassin, 2008; Kelly, 2016). 
  
A number of South African studies have shown how healthcare workers became 
nihilistic about their inability to cure patients, and repetitive nature of their work, 
growing bored and becoming neglectful of patients and indifferent to their 
suffering, especially in the wake of the HIV epidemic (Oppenheimer & Bayer, 
2007; Le Marcis, 2004, Le Marcis & Grard, 2015). Fassin (2008) found that 
healthcare workers in a South African hospital ‘learned’ emotional indifference 
and employed tactics to distance themselves from patients. As Le Marcis and 
Grard (2015) argued, “withdrawing from a caring relationship is for health 
professionals a way to carry on working” and a driver for the standardization and 
de-personalisation of care. 
  
Tummers et al. (2015) classify the behavioural ways that bureaucrats cope with 
the stresses of their work and the demands from and conflicts between 
bureaucratic rules, client’s needs, professional codes and their own values during 
client interactions in three ways: moving towards, moving away or moving 
against clients. Coping by moving towards clients may involve bending the rules 
in favour of the client or bureaucrats, spending extra time on cases or using their 
own personal resources to assist clients. Coping strategies that move away from 
clients include distancing moves that use bureaucratic categories and processes 
to limit engagement and services to clients. Strategies moving away from DG 
claimants included: directly confronting patients; moralising about certain groups 
of patients to simplify their decision-making; getting rid of patients by rushing 
through their applications; taking a task-oriented rather than patient oriented 
approach; denying responsibility for decisions or the welfare of applicants; avoiding 
engagements by limiting opportunities for conversation and, thus, claimant input; 
psychological withdrawal; and cultivating “bureaucratic indifference” (Herzfeld, 
1992) to detach and distance themselves from the needs of claimants. Some 
confronted patients directly, asserting their professional and bureaucratic 
authority to regain control over the interaction. As one doctor who used this 
strategy told me, “a lot of disability grant people are very aggressive and have an 
axe to grind. They are like Jehovah’s witnesses! You can’t be friendly and 
accommodating when people want to take over”. Some doctors also moved 
towards clients by bending the rules to accommodate claimants they felt pity for, 






While these strategies did help doctors to deal with DG applicants in the short-
term, they had negative consequences for the levels of trust between doctors and 
patients. Relationships between doctors and claimants were often fraught with 
tensions that were the result of divergent understandings of disability and rights 
to social assistance. Doctors’ defensiveness and ability to dictate the terms of the 
assessments and cut off patients could limit patients’ ability to participate in the 
assessment process, already constrained by language and education barriers. 
  
Being unable to tell their “side of the story” and being treated dismissively by 
doctors or even with contempt was frustrating and humiliating to claimants. As 
noted earlier, this led some to become aggressive with doctors, creating a 
vicious cycle that further entrenched barriers between patients as doctors acted 
to protect themselves against patients’ demands and re-assert control. This, 
unfortunately, reinforced existing patient mistrust, and in the case of treating 
doctors, potentially undermines already weak doctor-patient relationships. 
Doctors’ humanitarian actions toward particular patients they felt sympathetic 





This paper has shown that the DG assessment is not only a bureaucratic and 
medical process, but a social interaction shaped by the subjectivities and 
agencies of the doctor and claimant involved. Claimants’ understanding and 
subjective experiences of disability differed from biomedical conceptions of 
disability. Patients’ demands for the DG represent a form of protest by the poor 
about their economic exclusion and the physical and psychic suffering they 
experience as part of that exclusion. 
 
I showed that claimants could be active participants who creatively engaged in 
the assessment process, using narratives and physical performances of 
disablement and suffering to influence doctors’ decision-making. The agency of 
claimants who resist and disrupt the DG assessment process, and the ways in 
which doctors respond to this, highlight power dynamics that are often 
overlooked by the street-level bureaucracy literature. This is an important 
contribution to recent efforts to include the perspective of clients/citizens in 
street-level scholarship. 
 
The ways in which claimants interpreted eligibility criteria, interacted with 
doctors and strategically positioned themselves in relation to the disability 
category put pressure on doctors and the system in general. This shaped doctors’ 
decision-making and thus, policy implementation, however, often not in the way 





demands for the DG were seldom effective in convincing doctors to recommend 
a grant. Rather, doctors’ belief that claimants were trying to manipulate or 
deceive them, together with the pressures inherent in the medical work 
environment, led some doctors to employ defensive strategies that distanced 
them from claimants. 
 
While this study highlights the agency of beneficiaries, it also highlights the 
profound lack of opportunity that claimants have in creating other viable 
livelihoods and the lacunae in government strategies to alleviate poverty and 
integrate chronically ill people into society. The fact that sickness and disability 
become desirable in the South African context creates a perverse reversal of 
values and norms around health. Using the disability category to gain access to 
an income and soliciting compassion from gatekeepers in the hope of being the 
beneficiary of a humanitarian act, is an undesirable and uncertain way of 
achieving economic inclusion, especially when one’s performance of disability 
has to be re-enacted every six to twelve months. 
  
As this study has shown, the state’s distinction between the deserving disabled 
and undeserving non-disabled does not necessarily reflect either community or 
individual understandings of suffering and rights to social security or doctors’ 
understandings of disability. This not only creates potential for doctors to stray 
from official policy and guidelines, but also brings into question the boundaries 
between physical and other types of disadvantage and marginalisation. The 
categorical targeting of people with physical impairment for social assistance 
may not necessarily be viable or appropriate in a context where large numbers of 
people are unemployable (and therefore impaired by social and economic 
factors) and are also in need. The state has focused on reducing medical 
discretion and tightening eligibility criteria to exclude those who are not 
physically impaired and therefore ‘non-deserving’, but this cannot solve the 
bigger social and economic problems driving demand for the grant. This has 
distracted policymakers and legislators from developing a DG system that 
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